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Abstract
Two-sided markets have become increasingly more important during the last years, mostly because
of their numerous applications in housing, labor and dating. Consumer-supplier matching platforms pose
several technical challenges, specially due to the tradeoff between recommending suitable suppliers to
consumers and avoiding collisions among consumers’ preferences.
In this work, we study a general version of the two-sided sequential matching model introduced by
Ashlagi et al. (2019). The setting is the following: we (the platform) offer a menu of suppliers to each
consumer. Then, every consumer selects, simultaneously and independently, to match with a supplier or
to remain unmatched. Suppliers observe the subset of consumers that selected them, and choose either to
match a consumer or leave the system. Finally, a match takes place if both the consumer and the supplier
sequentially select each other. Each agent’s behavior is probabilistic and determined by a regular discrete
choicemodel. Our objective is to choose an assortment family that maximizes the expected cardinality of
the matching. Given the computational complexity of the problem, we show several provable guarantees
for the general model, which in particular, significantly improve the approximation factors previously
obtained.
1 Introduction
Two-sided marketplaces have grown in popularity in the recent years. This comes as a consequence of the
accelerating growth of the sharing economy which has become ubiquitous in our everyday life and whose
total combined revenue is estimated to reach $335 billions by 2025 (Osztovits A. and B., 2014). Those
platforms can be found in numerous areas such as labor (Upwork, TaskRabbit), accommodation (Airbnb,
HomeAway), dating (Match.com, eHarmony), ride-sharing (Uber, Lift, Netlift) and traditional buyer-seller
(Amazon, eBay, Craiglist). Because of this, two-sided markets have been extensively studied over the last
decade, see e.g., (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009; Filistrucchi et al., 2014; Duch-Brown, 2017), and
more specifically for the applications mentioned above, see e.g., (Hitsch et al., 2010; Horton, 2010; Fradkin,
2015; Banerjee et al., 2015; Marx and Schummer, 2019).
Roughly speaking, there are two types of agents in these platforms: consumers and suppliers. Generally,
a transaction or match occurs when a consumer and a supplier select each other. Unlike traditional market-
places, popular platforms such as Airbnb are increasingly considering agents’ preferences when designing
their systems (DeAmicis, 2015; Tu et al., 2014; Horton, 2017; Shi and Zhang, 2019). This decision is not
arbitrary given that accounting the preferences of both sides could reduce the frictions or collisions between
agents’ choices (Fradkin, 2015; Halaburda et al., 2016; Arnosti et al., 2018). The majority of the two-sided
markets are characterized by being decentralized, namely, the platform can only control what the agents
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observe but not their choices. In this context, the preferences of consumers and suppliers play an impor-
tant role since the platform can avoid congestion among popular choices by limiting the information to the
agents. Therefore, one of the main challenges in these two-sided matching platforms is balancing agents’
observations of the market and collisions among agents’ choices.
In this work, we address this challenge via assortment optimization in a two-sided sequential matching
model, initially introduced in (Ashlagi et al., 2019). Assortment optimization (Ryzin and Mahajan, 1999;
Kök et al., 2008; Berbeglia and Joret, 2020) has been mostly studied for one-sided markets, in which, the
platform aims to maximize its revenue by selecting an appropriate subset of goods from which a single
consumer observes and chooses a single item. In this context, discrete choice models play an important
role to define the consumer’s preferences. The adaptation of the classic assortment optimization problem
to two-sided markets is not immediate. Ashlagi et al. (2019) propose a novel sequential matching model in
which the platform has to take into account the preferences of both sides of the market. The objective of
the platform is to select an assortment of suppliers for each consumer in order to maximize the number of
pairs consumer-supplier that sequentially select each other. The authors show that even when the problem
has agents with simple choice models, the problem is strongly NP-hard. Hence, designing approximation
algorithms becomes a natural choice.
Our main contributions in this manuscript are: (1) to provide a general framework for two-sided sequen-
tial matching markets with heterogeneous agents that combines assortment optimization and general discrete
choice models; (2) to show provable approximation guarantees for the general model when the agents satisfy
mild assumptions; (3) to significantly improve the theoretical guarantees obtained in previous works.
In the remaining of this section, we formalize the problem, summarize our results and discuss related
literature. The analysis of our approximation schemes is divided in two parts: Section 2 and Section 3
correspond to easy-to-match and picky consumers, respectively.
1.1 Problem Formulation
In this work, we study the assortment optimization problem in two-sided sequential matching originally
introduced by Ashlagi et al. (2019). Formally, consider a bipartite graph G = (N ∪ V,E) where N =
{1, . . . , n} represents the set of consumers (or customers), V = {1, . . . ,m} corresponds to the set of
suppliers and E denotes the set of edges betweenN and V . We consider the unrestricted case in which E =
N × V , i.e., every supplier is compatible to every consumer. Our objective is to present an assortment (or
menu) of suppliers Si ⊆ V to each consumer i ∈ N in order to maximize the expected number of matches
between consumers and suppliers that is obtained as a result of a sequential random process. Following
the terminology in the discrete choice literature, we assume that the choices made by each consumer and
each supplier are determined by a system of choice probabilities. Formally, each consumer i ∈ N and
each supplier j ∈ V have a system of choice probabilities pi : V ∪ {0} × 2V → [0, 1] and qj : N ∪
{0} × 2N → [0, 1], respectively, where 0 denotes the outside option. This means, for instance, that given
a subset of options S ⊆ V , a consumer i ∈ N chooses j ∈ S ∪ {0} with probability pi(j, S) and zero
otherwise. To simplify the notation, in the remainder of the manuscript we will denote pij(S) = pi(j, S)
and qji(C) = qj(i, C), C ⊆ N .
Two-sided Sequential Matching. Let us describe the two-step random process that involves customers
and suppliers. We, as a platform, select an assortment of suppliers Si ⊆ V for each customer i ∈ N . Then,
every customer i ∈ N chooses–simultaneously, independently and irrevocably–with probability pij(Si) a
single supplier j ∈ Si or to remain unmatched with probability pi0(Si). Note that these terms define a
probability distribution over Si ∪ {0}, namely, Pi(Si) + pi0(Si) = 1, where Pi(Si) =
∑
j∈Si
pij(Si) is
called the demand function of consumer i. For every j ∈ V , let Cj be the subset of consumers (possibly
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empty) that chose j after the first stage. In the second step of the process, each supplier j ∈ V selects–
simultaneously, independently and irrevocably–a single consumer i from Cj with probability qji(Cj) or
decides to leave the system with probability qj0(Cj). As for the consumers, these terms define a probability
distribution over Cj∪{0}, i.e.,Qj(Cj)+qj0(Cj) = 1, whereQj(Cj) =
∑
i∈Cj
qji(Cj) denotes the demand
function of supplier j. Finally, a match occurs when both the consumer and the supplier sequentially select
each other.
As wemention above, our goal in this work is to study the cardinality case, i.e., we look for an assortment
family (also called menu profile) (S1, . . . , Sn) that maximizes the expected cardinality of the final matching.
Let us denote by S = {S ∈ 2N×V : S = (S1, . . . , Sn), Si ⊆ V for all i ∈ N} the universe of all menu
profiles. We denote by MS the random variable that indicates the cardinality of the matching and whose
distribution depends on the assortment family S ∈ S . Therefore, the optimization problem corresponds to
max
S∈S
E[MS ]. (1)
In the reminder of the paper, we denote by OPT the optimal value of Problem (1) and S∗ an optimal
assortment family.
The model described above generalizes the classic assortment optimization problem in which there
is a single consumer and the match occurs immediately after the consumer’s action (Ryzin and Mahajan,
1999). In this classic setting, numerous discrete choice models have been considered to study the consumers’
behavior (Kök et al., 2008), where the key difference is the system of choice probabilities. In this work, we
focus on those models that satisfy the regularity axiom. In simple words, this axiom states that the probability
of choosing a specific option does not increase when the menu is enlarged. Formally, consider a system of
choice probabilities f : O ∪ {0} × 2O → [0, 1] where O is the universe of options (either N or V in the
model previously described), then the regularity axiom is as follows,
Assumption 1 (Regularity Axiom). For any S ⊆ S′ ⊆ O, f(j, S′) ≤ f(j, S) for all j ∈ S ∪ {0}.
One of the most well-known regular models is themultinomial logit (MNL) (McFadden, 1974; Ryzin and Mahajan,
1999), in which each supplier has a public score and the probability that the consumer chooses one supplier
from the assortment is proportional to the total score of the assortment plus the score of the outside op-
tion. Under this model, the classic assortment optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time by
checking the revenue-ordered assortments (Ryzin and Mahajan, 1999). However, this is not true for a gen-
eral regular model; for example see (Aouad et al., 2018; Berbeglia and Joret, 2020). We refer the interested
reader to Section 1.2 for more details.
Given the computational complexity of the classic assortment optimization under a standard multino-
mial logit model, one would hope that something similar occurs in the two-sided sequential market de-
scribed above. Unfortunately, this is not the case as shown in (Ashlagi et al., 2019). The tradeoff between
recommending potentially good suppliers to consumers and avoiding collisions among consumers makes
the optimization problem more challenging. Specifically, Ashlagi et al. (2019) prove that Problem (1) is
NP-hard to solve even in the simple case when each consumer has the same multinomial logit model and
suppliers choose uniformly over their potential customers. Due to this hardness result, a natural approach is
to design an approximation algorithm with provable guarantees. We say that a polynomial time algorithm
achieves an approximation factor α ∈ (0, 1] for Problem (1) if it outputs a feasible solution S ∈ S such that
E[MS ] ≥ α ·OPT.
1.2 Related Work
Assortment optimization has been extensively studied in the revenue management literature. The classic
model focuses on one-sided markets in which there is a single consumer who chooses an item from a
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given menu. The consumer’s behavior is determined by an underlying choice model. This problem was
introduced by Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) who consider the MNL framework as a discrete choice model.
Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time by checking the revenue-
ordered assortments. However, the problem becomes NP-hard for other choice models (Bront et al., 2009;
Rusmevichientong et al., 2014; Aouad et al., 2018). An important class of choice models are those that
satisfy the regularity axiom. Berbeglia and Joret (2020) show that the revenue-ordered assortments strategy
provides provable guarantees for a general regular discrete choice model. Other examples of discrete choice
models that have been studied in the assortment optimization problem are the Mixed Multinomial Logit
(Rusmevichientong et al., 2014), the Nested Logit (Davis et al., 2014), Rank-based (Aouad et al., 2018) and
Markov chain based (Blanchet et al., 2016). For other choice models that satisfy the regularity axiom we
refer to (Berbeglia and Joret, 2020) and for a survey on assortment optimization we refer to (Kök et al.,
2008). Assortment optimization under capacity constraints has also been studied (Rusmevichientong et al.,
2010; Davis et al., 2013; Désir et al., 2015). In particular, under the MNL model the problem with capacity
constraints is known to be polynomial-time solvable (Rusmevichientong et al., 2010), however, under a
Markov chain model the problem becomes APX-hard (Désir et al., 2015).
The tradeoff between recommendations and collisions is a key challenge in our model. This prob-
lematic in two-sided markets has already been studied, see e.g., (Fradkin, 2015; Halaburda et al., 2016;
Kanoria et al., 2017; Arnosti et al., 2018). For instance, Arnosti et al. (2018) show that the restriction of
visibility of one side improves the welfare of both sides of the labor market. In our work, we control these
collisions by selecting appropriate assortments for consumers.
In a different perspective stands mechanism design considering agents with ordinal preferences. Two
classical desirable properties for the matching schemes implemented by a mechanism are strategy-proofness,
ensuring that it is rational for agents to reveal their true preferences, and stability, guaranteeing that no two
agents prefer each other over their current matching. We refer the interested reader to (Manlove, 2013)
for background, classical results and a contemporary literature review. Non-deterministic variants of the
problem have also been investigated such as uncertainty in the agents’ rankings (Aziz et al., 2019b,a), partial
information (Rastegari et al., 2013) and fractional (probabilistic) matchings (Alva and Manjunath, 2020).
Cechlárová et al. (2019) discuss current open problems in this context.
As we mentioned earlier, the assortment optimization problem in two-sided sequential matchings was
introduced in (Ashlagi et al., 2019). Ashlagi et al. (2019) consider a particular case of the following choice
model.
MNL-Uniform model. Suppose that each customer i ∈ N has a public score vij > 0 for every supplier
j ∈ V ∪ {0}, where 0 denotes the outside option. Then, the MNL model for consumer i ∈ N corresponds
to pij(S) = vij/(vi0 +
∑
j∈S vij) for S ⊆ V and j ∈ S ∪ {0}. Note that, without loss of generality, we
can assume vi0 = 1. In particular, Ashlagi et al. (2019) assume that consumers follow the same model, i.e.,
vij = vj for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V . On the other hand, each supplier j ∈ V has a public score uj ≥ 0 for the
outside option. Then, the Uniform model for supplier j ∈ V corresponds to qji(C) = 1/(|C| + uj) for
C ⊆ N , i ∈ C , and qj0(C) = uj/(|C|+ uj).
Ashlagi et al. (2019) show that Problem (1) under this model is NP-hard and provide a constant-factor
approximation algorithm. They prove that the analysis can be separated in two cases: vj ≥ 1 and vj ≤ 1.
For the first case, they provide a polynomial time algorithm that achieves a (1 − e−1/24)/8-approximation
factor . For the second case, they consider a bucketing technique to design an auxiliary LP problem whose
fractional solution can be rounded to obtain a (e− 1)/(173, 056e)-approximation factor.
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1.3 Our Contributions and Results
Our main contribution is to significantly expand the study of the assortment optimization problem (1) to
general discrete choice models that satisfy the regularity axiom. We provide approximation factors when
the choice models meet some mild assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first provable
guarantees for the general assortment optimization problem in two-sided markets. Moreover, as a conse-
quence of our general results, we are able to substantially improve the approximation guarantees obtained
by Ashlagi et al. (2019).
We separate our analysis by considering two types of consumers. First, we consider those consumers
that are easy-to-match. Roughly speaking, we say that an agent (either consumer or supplier) is easy-to-
match if, when facing only two options–match or remain unmatched–they are more likely to choose the
former. Formally, we define this type of agents as follows.
Definition 1 (Easy-to-match). A consumer i ∈ N is said to be easy-to-match if for any supplier j ∈ V we
have pij({j}) ≥ pi0({j}). Similarly, we say that a supplier j ∈ N is easy-to-match if for any consumer
i ∈ N we have qji({i}) ≥ qj0({i}).
Given this definition, our first main result for Problem (1) is stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that every consumer is easy-to-match and that each supplier has a monotone submod-
ular demand function. Then, there exists a randomized polynomial time algorithm for Problem (1) that
outputs an assortment family S = (S1, . . . , Sn) such that
E[MS ] ≥
(
1− e−1
2
)
·OPT,
where the expectation is also with respect to the algorithm’s randomization.
The algorithm mentioned in Theorem 1 uses as a subroutine the continuous greedy algorithm introduced
in (Vondrák, 2008) and designed for submodular optimization. Due to Theorem 1, we can immediately
obtain the following result which generalizes and significantly improves the (1 − e−1/24)/8 ≈ 0.0051
approximation factor proven by Ashlagi et al. (2019); we refer to Section 1.2 for more details on their
model.
Corollary 1. The algorithm in Theorem 1 achieves a (1−e−1)/2 ≈ 0.316 approximation factor for Problem
(1) under the MNL-Uniform model with scores vij ≥ 1 and uj ≥ 0.
More importantly, one of the key consequences of Theorem 1 is that it can be applied to a wide class
of discrete choice models called random utility-based models (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden, 1974). Simply
put, in this class each option has a random utility variable and the system of probability choices is defined
by the ordering of these variables. We discuss more in detail these models at the end of Section 2. Given
that the demand function for these models is submodular (e.g., see (Berbeglia and Joret, 2020)), we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Assume that every consumer is easy-to-match and every supplier follows a random utility-
based model, then there exists a randomized polynomial time algorithm that achieves a (1− e−1)/2 approx-
imation factor.
In the second part of our analysis, we study those customers that are picky. Informally, we say that a
consumer is picky when the probability of the outside option is always higher than the rest of the probabili-
ties. However, if we show the entire set of suppliers, then the consumer is more likely to choose a supplier.
Formally, we define this type of consumers as follows.
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Definition 2 (Picky consumers). A consumer i ∈ N is said to be picky, if pij(S) ≤ pi0(S) for all S ⊆ V
and any j ∈ S, but the demand function satisfies Pi(V ) ≥ pi0(V ).
Our second main result for Problem (1) is stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that every consumer is picky. Then, for Problem (1) the full assortment family V N =
(V, . . . , V ) satisfies
E[MV N ] ≥ Qmin ·
(
1− e−κ/2
1− e−κ
)
·OPT,
where Qmin = minj∈V,i∈N Qj({i}) and κ = n/m. Moreover, the approximation guarantee is always at
least Qmin/2.
Note that when suppliers are easy-to-match the worst-case guarantee is always at least 1/4. In addition,
thanks to Theorem 2 we are able to derive Corollary 3 for picky consumers with a MNL model (we do not
require the same model for everyone). In this setting, being picky is equivalent to the condition vij ≤ 1.
Corollary 3. The full assortment V N achieves a 1/4-approximation factor for Problem (1) under the MNL-
Uniform model with scores vij ≤ 1 such that
∑
j∈V vij ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N and uj ≤ 1.
We emphasize that Corollary 3 applies for the general case in which each consumer has different scores
for each supplier. Ashlagi et al. (2019) considers only the case when vij = vj for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V , obtaining
a (e− 1)/(173, 056e) ≈ 0.0000036 approximation factor; remarkably improved by Corollary 3.
Finally, by using Corollaries 1 and 3, we conclude our main result for the MNL-Uniformmodel. Observe
that a key assumption of this result is that consumers follow the same MNL model, i.e., vij = vj .
Corollary 4. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that achieves a 1/8-approximation factor for Prob-
lem (1) under the MNL-Uniform model with scores vj > 0 such that
∑
j∈V vj ≥ 1 and uj ≤ 1.
2 Analysis when Consumers are Easy-to-Match
In this section, we focus on the analysis when every consumer is easy-to-match and suppliers have a mono-
tone submodular demand function. Our main result in this section, Theorem 1, is the first approximation
guarantee for Problem (1) when customers and suppliers follow a general regular discrete choice model.
We emphasize that we do not require customers and suppliers to follow the same discrete choice model
as in (Ashlagi et al., 2019). We do require submodularity for the demand function of suppliers, however,
this is not stringent since a wide class of models called random utility based models satisfy this condition;
see Corollary 2. Finally, under the model studied in (Ashlagi et al., 2019) we substantially improve the
approximation guarantee in Corollary 1.
First, for every supplier j ∈ V , recall that the demand function Qj : 2A → [0, 1] is defined as the prob-
ability Qj(A) that supplier j chooses at least one consumer from A ⊆ N when A is shown as assortment.
Formally, given a subset A ⊆ N
Qj(A) =
∑
i∈A
qji(A).
Since, we are assuming the regularity axiom, then Qj is monotone increasing1 (Berbeglia and Joret, 2020).
For j ∈ V and assortment family S ∈ S , let Y Sj be the indicator random variable that takes value 1 when
supplier j is matched at the end of the process and 0 otherwise. Also, for j ∈ V and assortment family
1Qj(A) ≤ Qj(B) for all A ⊆ B.
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S ∈ S , let ASj be the random set of consumers who selected j. Observe that given A ⊆ N , Y
S
j = 1 with
probability Qj(A) and Y Sj = 0 otherwise. Therefore,
E
[
Y Sj
]
= E
[
E
[
Y Sj |A
S
j
]]
= E
[
Qj(A
S
j )
]
which gives us the following representation of our objective function
E[MS ] =
∑
j∈V
E
[
Y Sj
]
=
∑
j∈V
E
[
Qj(A
S
j )
]
. (2)
Let us prove the following upper bound for the optimal value OPT which will help us to show the main
result in this section, Theorem 1. This bound was already used in (Ashlagi et al., 2019), but we extend it to
any demand function.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, Problem (1) is upper bounded by the following optimization problem
max


∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj) : Aj ⊆ N, Aj ∩Aj′ = ∅, ∀j, j
′ ∈ V,
⋃
j∈V
Aj = N

 . (3)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary assortment family S ∈ S . Denote by AS0 the random set of consumers that
decided to remain unmatched. Since each consumer selects only one supplier, AS0 , A
S
1 , . . . , A
S
m form a
partition ofN , i.e.,ASj ∩A
S
j′ = ∅ for every distinct pair of suppliers j, j
′ ∈ V ∪{0} andAS0 ∪A
S
1 ∪· · ·∪A
S
m =
N . Therefore, in Equation (2) we have
E[MS ] = E

∑
j∈V
Qj(A
S
j )


=
∑
(A0,A1,...,Am):
∀j 6=j′, Aj∩Aj′=∅
A0∪A1∪···∪Am=N

∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj)

 · P(AS0 = A0, AS1 = A1, . . . , ASm = Am)
≤ max
(A0,A1,...,Am):
∀j 6=j′, Aj∩Aj′=∅
A0∪A1∪···∪Am=N


∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj)

 = max(A1,...,Am):
∀j,j′∈V, Aj∩Aj′=∅
A1∪···∪Am=N


∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj)


where the last equality is because the demand functions Qj are monotone increasing, therefore, the maxi-
mum is achieved when A0 = ∅.
Observe that if the functions Qj are submodular2 , then Problem (3) corresponds to the classic submodu-
lar welfare problem (Lehmann et al., 2006); we refer the interested reader to Appendix A for more details.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that we are assuming that the demand functions for suppliersQj are submodular.
Let us denote by OPT the optimal value for Problem (3). Due to Lemma 1, we know that OPT ≤ OPT.
Vondrák (2008) proves that there exists a randomized algorithm that returns a solution A = (A1, . . . , Am)
for the submodular welfare maximization problem 3 such that (in expectation)∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj) ≥ (1− e
−1) ·OPT.
2Qj(A ∪ {e}) −Qj(A) ≥ Qj(B ∪ {e}) −Qj(B) for all e ∈ N and A ⊆ B ⊆ N\{e}.
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Vondrák (2008) proves this result by transforming the problem into a submodular maximization problem
with parition constraints and then applying the continuous greedy algorithm; we refer the interested reader
to Appendix A for more details. From partition A we construct the following assortment family: for each
consumer i ∈ Aj assign menu Si = {j}. Since A is a partition, then each menu Si is a singleton. Let us
compute the objective value for this assortment family S. Denote by A
S
j the random subset of consumers
in Aj that selects j when the assortment family is S. Observe that the random sets A
S
j are independent
between each other since their supports do not intersect, so we can separate our analysis for each supplier.
For each supplier j ∈ V
E[Y Sj ] = E
[
Qj(A
S
j )
]
=
∑
A⊆Aj
Qj(A)
∏
i∈A
pij({j})
∏
i∈Aj\A
(1− pij({j})). (4)
Note the we have the last expression because each consumer either selects j or decides to remain unmatched.
More importantly, it corresponds to the multilinear extension of Qj; for a formal definition of this extension
and its properties, we refer the interested reader to Appendix A. Since, consumers are easy-to-match then
for any i ∈ N, j ∈ V we have pij({j}) ≥ 1/2. Furthermore, given that Qj is monotone increasing we
obtain the following
∑
A⊆Aj
Qj(A)
∏
i∈A
pij({j})
∏
i∈Aj\A
(1− pij({j})) ≥
∑
A⊆Aj
Qj(A)
2|Aj |
, (5)
where we apply the monotonicity property in Fact 1. Now, consider the following result for general submod-
ular functions.
Lemma 2 ((Feige et al., 2011)). Consider a ground set of elements E and a non-negative submodular func-
tion f : 2E → R+. Let B(1/2) be the random subset of E that is constructed by drawing each element
independently from E with probability 1/2. Then, E[f(B(1/2))] ≥ f(E)/2.
By using Lemma 2 in the right-hand side of Equation (5) we obtain
∑
A⊆Aj
Qj(A)
2|Aj |
≥
1
2
·Qj(Aj).
Therefore, we obtain our desired result (in expectation) for assortment family S,
E[MS] =
∑
j∈V
E[Y Sj ] ≥
1
2
·
∑
j∈V
Qj(Aj) ≥
1− e−1
2
·OPT ≥
1− e−1
2
·OPT .
If one wants a deterministic algorithm, then we could use the standard greedy algorithm for the submod-
ular welfare problem (3). However, our final guarantee would worsen to a 1/4-approximation factor. We
refer the interested reader to the Appendix A for more details on the relationship between Problem (3) and
the monotone submodular maximization problem under partition constraints.
Thanks to Theorem 1, we are able to show Corollary 1 which provides a considerably better factor
approximation for the MNL-Uniform model studied in (Ashlagi et al., 2019).
Proof of Corollary 1. Recall the MNL and Uniform models described in Section 1.2. Observe that con-
sumers are easy-to-match when they follow a MNL model with parameters vij ≥ 1. On the other hand, the
demand function for the Uniform model is submodular.
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Random Utility-based Models. A large class of discrete choice models that satisfy the regularity axiom
is the class of random utility based models (RUM) (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden, 1974; Baltas and Doyle,
2001). Luce et al. (1965) originally observed that this class of models satisfy the regularity axiom. We now
formally defined this class for suppliers, which can be similarly defined for consumers. In the RUM class,
each consumer i ∈ N ∪ {0} has a random utility (or value) Ui, where 0 denotes the outside option. These
random variables U0, U1, . . . , Un define a joint probability measure Pr over Rn+1 such that Pr(Ui = Ui′) =
0 for all i, i′ ∈ N ∪ {0} with i 6= i′. Therefore, given a choice set C ⊆ N , a supplier j ∈ V selects a
customer from i ∈ C ∪ {0} with probability
qji(C) = Pr(Ui = max{Uk : k ∈ C ∪ {0}}).
One important feature of this class is that the demand function Qj(C) =
∑
i∈C qji(C) is submodular;
see (Berbeglia and Joret, 2020) for a proof. The contrary, however, is not true; not every model with a
submodular demand function is a RUM. Given the submodularity property of the RUM’s, we immedi-
ately obtain Corollary 2 as a consequence of Theorem 1. Numerous important and widely used models
fit in the RUM class, and more importantly, assortment optimization has been extensively studied under
this class of models. Classic examples are the Multinomial Logit model, the Mixed Multinomial Logit
model (Luce, 2012; Rusmevichientong et al., 2014), Nested Logit models (Davis et al., 2014), Rank-based
models (Aouad et al., 2018), Markov chain based models (Blanchet et al., 2016; Berbeglia, 2016), Distance
based models (Murphy and Martin, 2003) such as the Mallow models (Mallows, 1957; Désir et al., 2016;
Jagabathula and Vulcano, 2018), and other models in neuroscience (Webb, 2019). See (Berbeglia and Joret,
2020) for more references on RUM’s.
3 Analysis when Consumers are Picky
In this section, we focus on the analysis when every consumer is picky and the proof of our main result
Theorem 2. We emphasize that we do not require customers and suppliers to follow the same discrete
choice model. As a direct consequence of Theorem 2 we derive much better guarantees for the MNL-
Uniform model previously studied in (Ashlagi et al., 2019); see Corollaries 3 and 4.
Let us show the following upper and lower bounds for the objective function of Problem (1). This will
help us to prove the main result in this section, Theorem 2.
Lemma 3. For every assortment family S ∈ S we have
Qmin ·
∑
j∈V
P(ASj 6= ∅) ≤ E[MS ] ≤ Qmax ·
∑
j∈V
P(ASj 6= ∅), (6)
where Qmax = maxj∈V Qj(N) and Qmin = minj∈V,i∈N Qj({i}). Additionally, if all suppliers are easy-to-
match, then we obtain the following bounds
1
2
·
∑
j∈V
P(ASj 6= ∅) ≤ E[MS ] ≤
∑
j∈V
P(ASj 6= ∅), (7)
Proof. Given that the function Qj is monotone increasing, then Qmin ≤ Qj(A) ≤ Qmax for any non-empty
A ⊆ N . Moreover, observe that
E
[
Qj(A
S
j )
]
= E
[
Qj(A
S
j )|A
S
j 6= ∅
]
· P(ASj 6= ∅) + E
[
Qj(A
S
j )|A
S
j = ∅
]
· P(ASj = ∅)
= E
[
Qj(A
S
j )|A
S
j 6= ∅
]
· P(ASj 6= ∅),
where we use Qj(∅) = 0. Equation (6) follows by using the bounds mentioned above. Equation (7) follows
by noting that Qmax ≤ 1, and since all suppliers are easy-to-match, then Qmin ≥ 1/2.
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Let h˜ : S → R≥0 and h : S → R≥0 be the functions
h˜(S) :=
∑
j∈V
P(ASj 6= ∅) and h(S) :=
∑
j∈V
P(ASj = ∅) (8)
Note that h˜(S) = m−h(S), where ∅ is the empty assortment and h(∅) = m. In the reminder of this section,
we will denote the full assortment family by V N = (V, . . . , V ).
Proposition 1. Assume every consumer is picky. Then,
h˜(V N ) ≥

 1− e− n2m
1−
(
1− 1m+1
)n

 ·max
S∈S
h˜(S).
Proof. Recall that we are assuming that each consumer is picky, i.e., for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V and S ⊆ V we
have pij(S) ≤ pi0(S) and Pi(V ) ≥ 1/2. First, let us prove that for all S ∈ S we have
h(S) ≥ m
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)n
(9)
For any assortment family S = (S1, . . . , Sn), recall that pij(Si) = 0 for any j /∈ Si. Observe that
h(S) =
∑
j∈V
P(ASj = ∅) =
∑
j∈V
∏
i∈N
(1− pij(Si)).
Using the previous expression, we obtain the following lower bound for h(S)
min
∑
j∈V
∏
i∈N
(1− zij) (10)
s.t.
∑
j∈V
zij + zi0 = 1, ∀ i ∈ N
zij ≤ zi0, ∀ i ∈ N, j ∈ V
z ∈ [0, 1]N×(V ∪{0}).
Note that the inequality constraints correspond to our assumption that all consumers are picky. It is not hard
to show that the optimal solution for Problem (10) is z∗ij = 1/(m + 1) for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V ∪ {0}; we refer
the interested reader to Appendix B for a detailed proof of this. Therefore, we obtain
min
S∈S
h(S) ≥ m
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)n
On the other hand, let us prove that the full assortment family V N satisfies
h(V N ) ≤ me−
n
2m . (11)
By using the inequality 1− x ≤ e−x we obtain
h(V N ) =
∑
j∈V
∏
i∈N
(1− pij(V )) ≤
∑
j∈V
e−
∑
i∈N pij(V )
≤ max


∑
j∈V
e−zj : z ∈ RV≥0, such that
∑
j∈V
zj ≥
n
2

 , (12)
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where the last inequality is valid since we are assuming that Pi(V ) ≥ pi0(V ) which implies that Pi(V ) ≥
1/2 and
∑
j∈V
∑
i∈N pij(V ) =
∑
i∈N Pi(V ) ≥ n/2. Observe that the objective function in Problem (12)
is component-wise decreasing, i.e., if z ≤ z′ (component-wise), then
∑
j∈V e
−zj ≥
∑
j∈V e
−z′j . More
importantly, this function is convex. Therefore, the optimal solution z∗ satisfies
∑
j∈V z
∗
j =
n
2 . It is not
hard to prove that given the symmetry of the objective function, then the optimal solution is z∗j = n/2m for
all j ∈ V ; we give a detailed proof of this in Appendix B. Consequently, we can conclude that
h(V N ) ≤ me−
n
2m .
Combining the two previous bounds we obtain that
me−
n
2m ≥ h(V N ) ≥ min
S∈S
h(S) ≥ m
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)n
,
which is equivalent to
m(1− e−
n
2m ) ≤ h˜(V N ) ≤ max
S∈S
h˜(S) ≤ m
(
1−
(
1−
1
m+ 1
)n)
.
Therefore,
h˜(V N ) ≥

 1− e− n2m
1−
(
1− 1m+1
)n

 ·max
S∈S
h˜(S)
By using Proposition 1, we are now ready to prove the main result of this section, Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that E[MS∗ ] = OPT. When suppliers are easy-to-match, Lemma 3 implies
two important facts
OPT ≤ max
S∈S
h˜(S) and Qmin · h˜(V
N ) ≤ E[MV N ]. (13)
Therefore, we obtain the following sequence of inequalities
E[MV N ] ≥ Qmin · h˜(V
N ) (Eq. (13))
≥ Qmin ·

 1− e− n2m
1−
(
1− 1m+1
)n

 ·max
S∈S
h˜(S) (Proposition 1)
≥ Qmin ·

 1− e− n2m
1−
(
1− 1m+1
)n

 ·OPT (Eq. (13))
≥ Qmin ·
(
1− e−
κ
2
1− e−κ
)
·OPT,
where in the last inequality we use that n = κm with κ > 0 and
(
1− 1m+1
)κm
≥ e−κ. Also note that if
κ→∞, i.e. n≫ m, then 1−e
−κ
2
1−e−κ
→ 1. On the other hand, if κ→ 0, i.e. n≪ m, then 1−e
−κ
2
1−e−κ
→ 12 . Since,
1−e−
κ
2
1−e−κ ≥ 1/2 for any κ ≥ 0, the worst-case guarantee E[MV N ] ≥
Qmin
2 ·OPT follows.
11
Observe that when suppliers are easy-to-match, Qmin ≥ 1/2, then Theorem 2 provides a 1/4-approximation
guarantee. Due to Theorem 2, we can immediately derive Corollary 3 which considerably improves the ap-
proximation factor obtained by Ashlagi et al. (2019).
Proof of Corollary 3. Recall the MNL-Uniform model described in Section 1.2. Observe that if vij ≤ v0 =
1, then for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V, S ⊆ V we have that pij(S) ≤ pi0(S). Also, since
∑
j∈V vij ≥ 1 we have
Pi(V ) ≥ 1/2 for all i ∈ N . On the other hand, when suppliers have a score uj ≤ 1 for the outside option,
then they are easy-to-match, since qji({j}) = 1/(1 + uj) ≥ 1/2. The result follows by applying Theorem
2.
Using Corollaries 1 and 3, we can conclude Corollary 4 which provides a significant improvement for
the MNL-Uniform model studied by Ashlagi et al. (2019).
Proof of Corollary 4. As in (Ashlagi et al., 2019) we separate suppliers into two subsets A = {j ∈ V :
vj ≥ 1} and B = {j ∈ V : vj < 1}. Denote by OPT(n/2, A) the optimal values for our problem with
n/2 consumers and suppliers in A; similarly define OPT(n/2, B). Suppose there exists an algorithm with a
γA-approximation factor for the problem with suppliers inA. On the other hand, suppose that there exists an
algorithm with a γB-approximation for the problem with n/2 customers and suppliers in B. Then, Theorem
3.4 in (Ashlagi et al., 2019) shows that there exists an algorithm with a 12 min{γA, γB}-approximation for
the original problem. In our case γA = (1 − e−1)/2 and γB = 1/4. Therefore, we conclude our 1/8-
approximation factor.
4 Conclusion
This work presented a general framework for the assortment optimization problem in two-sided sequential
matching markets. While the related literature focuses on the MNL-Uniform model, we significantly ex-
panded it to general choice models that satisfy the regularity axiom. We studied two types of consumers:
easy-to-match and picky, for which we provided provable guarantees. Moreover, when applied to the MNL-
Uniform model, our general results are shown to significantly improve the constant-factor approximations
previously obtained. Several research directions remain to be explored. One possible extension is to study a
model that considers revenue for each matching and the objective is to maximize the total expected revenue.
Also, constraints on the assortments could be considered such as cardinality or partition. Finally, we think
that it would be interesting to look at models that allow a second round of matches, namely, remaining
unmatched suppliers can be matched.
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A The Submodular Welfare Problem
Preliminaries on Submodularity. Consider a ground set of elements E and a non-negative set function
f : 2E → R+. We denote the marginal value for any subset A ⊆ E and e ∈ E by fA(e) := f(A+e)−f(A),
where A+ e := A ∪ {e}. A set function f is submodular if, and only if, it satisfies the diminishing returns
property. Namely, for any e ∈ E and A ⊆ B ⊆ E\{e}, fA(e) ≥ fB(e). We say that f is monotone if for
any A ⊆ B ⊆ E , we have f(A) ≤ f(B).
The Submodular Welfare Maximization Problem. Consider a set of r items R = {1, . . . , r} and a set
of k players K = {1, . . . , k} with monotone submodular utility functions fi : 2R → R+. The objective
in this problem is to find a partition of the items into disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sk that maximizes
∑
i∈K fi(Si).
It is well-known that this problem can be reduced to a submodular maximization problem with partition
constraints (Lehmann et al., 2006). This is done by making r copies of each item, one for each player, but
only allowing one copy to be assigned. Formally, define an auxiliary ground set E = R× K. Each subset
S ⊆ E can be written uniquely as S =
⋃
i∈K({i} × Si), then define f : 2
E → R+ as follows
f(S) =
∑
i∈K
fi(Si).
Observe that the sum preserves monotonicity and submodularity, and moreover, considering the repre-
sentation of the subsets S ⊆ E it is not difficult to verify that f is monotone and submodular. Finally,
consider the following partition constraints I = {S ⊆ E : |S ∩ (K × {j})| ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ R}, i.e.,
we allow each item to be assigned only once. Therefore, the submodular welfare problem is equivalent
to max{f(S) : S ∈ I}. This problem belongs to a larger class of problems of submodular maxi-
mization under matroid constraints. Fisher et al. (1978) show that the standard greedy algorithm achieves
a (1/2)-approximation. Notably, Vondrák (2008) introduces the continuous greedy algorithm (see also
(Calinescu et al., 2011)) which uses a continuous extension of the submodular function to achieve a tight
1− 1/e approximation factor (Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1978; Feige, 1998).
Multilinear Extension and the Continuous Greedy Algorithm. Recall the submodular maximization
problem subject to partition constraints described above. Let us denote the indicator vector of a set S ⊆ E by
1S ∈ {0, 1}
E , where 1S(e) = 1 if e ∈ S and zero otherwise; and the polytope P(I) = conv{1S | S ∈ I}.
For any non-negative set function f : 2E → R+, its multilinear extension F : [0, 1]E → R+ is defined
for any y ∈ [0, 1]E as the expected value of f(Sy), where Sy is the random set generated by drawing
independently each element e ∈ E with probability ye. Formally,
F (y) = ES∼y[f(S)] =
∑
S⊆E
f(S)
∏
e∈S
ye
∏
e/∈S
(1− ye). (14)
Observe, this is in fact an extension of f , since for any subset S ⊆ E , we have f(S) = F (1S).
Fact 1. (Calinescu et al., 2011). Let f be a monotone submodular function and F its multilinear extension.
By monotonicity of f , we have ∂F∂ye ≥ 0 for any e ∈ E . This implies that for any x ≤ y coordinate-wise,
F (x) ≤ F (y). On the other hand, by submodularity of f , F is concave in any positive direction, i.e., for
any e1, e2 ∈ E we have
∂2F
∂ye1∂ye2
≤ 0.
Broadly speaking, the continuous greedy algorithm (Vondrák, 2008; Calinescu et al., 2011) works as
follows: the algorithm starts with the empty set y0 = 0 and for every t ∈ [0, 1] continuously finds a feasible
direction z that maximizes∇F (yt)·z overP(I), where yt is the current fractional point. Then, the algorithm
updates yt according to z. Finally, the algorithm outputs a feasible set by rounding y1 according to pipage
rounding (Ageev and Sviridenko, 2004).
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B Remaining Proofs
Let us recall Problem (10).
min
∑
j∈V
∏
i∈N
(1− zij)
s.t.
∑
j∈V
zij + zi0 = 1, ∀ i ∈ N
zij ≤ zi0, ∀ i ∈ N, j ∈ V.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution of Problem (10) is z∗ij = 1/(m + 1) for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V .
Proof. Observe that zij ≤ zi0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V , then for any j ∈ V we obtain∏
i∈N
(1− zij) ≥
∏
i∈N
(1− zi0),
with equality if zij = zi0 for all i ∈ N . Therefore, the optimal value satisfies z∗ij = z
∗
i0 for all i ∈ N . More
importantly, the equality constraints imply that z∗ij = 1/(m+ 1) for all i ∈ N, j ∈ V ∪ {0}.
Now, let us recall Problem (12).
min
∑
j∈V
e−zj
s.t.
∑
j∈V
zj ≥
n
2
z ∈ RV≥0.
Proposition 3. The optimal solution for Problem (12) is z∗j = n/2m for all j ∈ V .
Proof. As we mention in the proof of Proposition 1, the optimal solution satisfies
∑
j∈V z
∗
j =
n
2 . Let us
consider the point z∗j = n/2m for all j ∈ V and a perturbation ǫ ∈ R
V . Given the equality condition, the
perturbation satisfies
∑
j∈V ǫj = 0. Now, let us evaluate the objective function in the point z
∗ + ǫ
∑
j∈V
e−z
∗
j−ǫj = e−
n
2m
∑
j∈V
e−ǫj ≥ e−
n
2m ·
∑
j∈V
(1− ǫj) = me
− n
2m ,
where in the inequality we use that 1−x ≤ e−x. Observe that the right-hand side is the value of the objective
function in z∗. Then, any perturbation of z∗ has a greater objective value, proving that z∗ is the optimal point
(recall that the objective function is convex).
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